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Governance Mechanisms and Efficiency: Evidence from an Alternative 
Insurance (Takaful) Market 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance attributes and both 
technical and scale efficiencies of the global Takaful Insurance operators. Using alternative 
estimators for efficiency, our results show that Takaful operators are inefficient suggesting the 
presence of widespread managerial lethargy and operational inefficiency. Additional analyses 
indicate that non-executive directors, audit committees, and product diversification do not 
improve technical efficiency. Rather, audit committees and regulatory jurisdiction tends to 
reduce scale efficiency. We also find that CEO/chair duality, board size, organizational age, 
regulatory jurisdiction and firm size have a positive relationship with technical efficiency. We 
further report that non-executive directors, Shari’ah board, product diversification and 
institutional ownership improve scale efficiency. In particular, the study provides new and 
extended regional evidence on the efficiency of the Takaful industry in the Middle East North 
Africa (MENA) and the Southeast East Asian (ASEAN) region. Our findings provide important 
policy implications for investors, regulators, and other market participants. 
 
 
Keywords: Board characteristics, Bootstrap DEA, Corporate governance, Data Envelopment 
Analysis, Takaful, Technical efficiency  
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1. Introduction 
It has long been argued that governance mechanisms provide shareholders with incentive to 
invest in a firm by ensuring that managers act in the best interest of shareholders to avoid 
agency problems with a view to maintaining balance between the varied interests of 
stakeholders (see Ogden & Watson, 1999). Governance mechanisms also assure stakeholders 
that the actions of the organization are congruent with the norms of society. Governance in 
Islam, albeit similar to the Anglo-American model, is likely to be perceived as being more 
complex. Managerial incentives are also present in Islam. In the conventional setting, agency 
problems arise when managerial interests deviate from interests of shareholders (which mainly 
emanates from wealth maximization). However, in an Islamic framework, any deviation from 
placing all shareholders’ funds in investments that are deemed to be Shari’ah1-compliant brings 
about an additional source of agency problem (Safieddine, 2009).  In particular, the operations 
of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) are principally driven by a constrained business model 
with a dual governance layer. This distinct model involves both moral accountability values 
and legal responsibilities (Abdelsalam et al., 2016, 2017). In assuring stakeholders that actions 
of the firm are in line with Islamic norms, besides being governed by board of directors like 
conventional financial institutions, IFIs are required to incorporate additional monitoring 
mechanisms represented by Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSB) in order to provide the all-
important religious-ethical legitimacy expected by stakeholders2.  
 While corporate governance and efficiency measurement matters, both have captured a great 
deal of attention within the conventional insurance industry (e.g. Akhigbe & McNulty, 2005; 
Byeonyong & Weiss., 2005; Huang et al., 2011; Zheka , 2005; Wang et al., 2007; Har Eling  
& Luhnen; 2010; Hardwick et al., 2011 ). However, only scant attention has been given to 
identify the impact of governance mechanisms on technical and scale efficiencies3 in an 
                                                                
1 The word ‘Shari’ah’ literally means the path to follow and denotes the all-embracing legal system that regulates the lives of 
Muslims. In relation to the underlying principle of Islamic law governing commerce and finance is the doctrine of 
‘permissibility’, which maintains that everything in economic affairs is permitted except those explicitly forbidden by divine 
guidance (Kamali, 2000). Prohibitions under Islamic law can be broadly classified as riba (usury) and gharar (uncertainty) 
amongst others (see Siddiqi, 2004; El-Gamal, 2001; Al-Dhareer, 1997). 
 
2 It is well accepted that Shari’ah supervisory boards (SSB) operating in Islamic financial institutions like Takaful carry a 
responsibility for providing religious assurance which contributes to the soundness of the Islamic governance system by 
endorsing the religious-ethical legitimacy to stakeholders (Bougatef, 2015). The SSB also has added responsibility for issuing 
an annual Shari’ah report on the religious compliance of operations which is communicated in annual reports of all Islamic 
financial institutions (see Maali et al., 2006; Ullah et al., 2016).   
 
3 Technical efficiency refers to the effectiveness with which an output is produced with a given set of inputs. This is related to 
productive efficiency in the sense that productive efficiency deals with producing at the lowest point on the short run average 
cost. Alternatively, a firm is said to be scale efficient when its operations is most favorable whereby any adjustment on its size 
will render it less efficient. 
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alternative insurance industry, like the Islamic insurance market (hereafter referred to as 
Takaful) 4 (Kader et al., 2010; 2014). The size of the global Takaful market has shown 
exponential growth and popularity across the globe due to its appeal as a complimentary form 
of insurance suitable to Muslims. With the accelerated rise of the Takaful industry worldwide, 
the case for exploring the influence of board characteristics on the efficiency of Takaful 
operators becomes even more compelling. 
 The major difference between the conventional insurance and Takaful is the treatment of 
investment of funds. Unlike conventional insurance companies, which invest mainly in 
interest-based businesses, Takaful is the paradigm of profit-and-loss sharing. Shari’ah 
compliance also plays a pivotal role in Takaful where financial and investment issues (e.g. 
reserving, design of policy contracts, premium ratings etc.) should conform to the laws and 
regulations prescribed by religious doctrine (Iqbal and Greuning, 2008). Thus, examining the 
corporate governance-efficiency relationship in the Takaful industry is important because the 
fiduciary responsibilities of directors in this sector not only extend to policyholders and 
shareholders, but they are also bound to supervision by individual company’s SSB and industry 
regulators across different jurisdictions.  
 We employ a comprehensive sample of 134 global Takaful insurers in 21 countries for the 
period 2002 to 2013. In particular, we examine the relationship between CEO/ Chair duality, 
ownership structure, board size, SSB size and audit committees on both technical and scale 
efficiency. To extend prior evidence, we utilize four separate estimators, (i) DEA, (ii) (ii) Free 
Disposal Hull (FDH), (iii) Order M, DEA and (iv), the DEA Bootstrap method5. This empirical 
setting allows us to make vigorous comparative assessment of efficiency. To the best of our 
knowledge; this is the first study to use alternative efficiency measurement techniques to obtain 
efficiency scores. 
                                                                
 
4 The term Takaful, refers to a scheme based on solidarity and mutual assistance which aims at providing mutual financial aid 
and assistance to participants in case of need  (Wahab et al., 2007: p.374). Takaful is supported by four principles of Islamic 
finance, which are the avoidance of impermissible business, uncertainty, interest, and gambling.  
 
5 The estimator is deterministic and similar to The Free Disposal Hull (FDH) is deterministic and similar to the DEA estimator, 
non-parametric, very sensitive to outliers and highly sensitive to noise. The FDH estimator was introduced by Deprins, Simar, 
and Tulkens (1984). Unlike the DEA estimator, it also relaxes the convexity assumption. The Order-M estimator, introduced 
by Cazals et al. (2002) is also a  non-parametric and a simulation method. It is non-convex, not affected by noise or outliers 
and its root-n property helps avert dimensionality problem. Alternatively,  the DEA Bootstrap developed by Simar and Wilson 
(2007) is also a non-parametric estimator.  However, as opposed to the DEA in which the application of statistical inference is 
impossible due to its deterministic nature (there is no random error to introduce unexplained variability), the bootstrap method 
allows this. The bootstrap DEA is also asymptotically consistent. 
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 Our findings show that the CEO/chair duality has a significantly positive association with 
both technical and scale efficiencies of Takaful insurers. We also find that the ownership 
structure tends to significantly reduce technical efficiency of Takaful firms, but significantly 
increases scale efficiency. Moreover, board size reveals a positive relationship with technical 
efficiency of global Takaful insurers. In relation to the SSB size, we find this extra governance 
mechanism significantly promotes higher scale efficiency for Takaful firms. Interestingly, 
however, we show that the presence of audit committees does not affect both technical and 
scale efficiencies of Takaful. 
  Our regional comparative analyses on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and 
Southeast East Asian (ASEAN) regions show that both the ownership structure and CEO/chair 
duality significantly reduces technical efficiency for operators in the MENA region. For the 
scale efficiency of Takaful operators in the MENA, board size indicates a negative association, 
while both the separation of power and SSB size reveals a positive association. Within the 
ASEAN region, we find that only the CEO/chair duality significantly relates with technical 
efficiency. Audit committees and SSB size have a positive association with scale efficiency, 
while ownership structure has a negative relationship. 
 This study contributes to existing literature in a number of ways. First, using a unique 
dataset, we present cross-country evidence on the association between corporate governance 
and technical and scale efficiency which extends the prior literature in conventional insurance 
(Huang et al., 2011; and Wang et al., 2007). Second, by employing alternative and more robust 
estimation methods, our paper extends the limited evidence on efficiency particularly with 
respect to the Takaful sector. In reality, both Kader et al.’s (2010; 2014) studies failed to 
consider the effects of noise, outliers6 and country governance/macroeconomic environment 
surrounding Takaful operators, which all tend to have potential significant effect on efficiency 
outputs. Moreover, these studies ignore the SSB double-governance, which forms an important 
monitoring mechanism for Takaful companies’ world-wide. Finally, our study offers additional 
insights beyond existing literature through identifying a regional effect for the Takaful industry 
                                                                
6 We contend that because gross contributions are used as outputs, where large variations across units exist, outliers 
are likely to be present. Our view is supported by researchers such as Liu et al. (2010) who argue that the presence 
of outliers could substantially inflate estimates. Furthermore, the DEA estimators used by both the Kader et al’s. 
(2010, 2014) studies are, indeed, susceptible to dimensionality problems. In fact, this strand of literature has been 
overwhelmed with debate concerning the statistical weakness of the DEA estimator (see Simar & Wilson, 2007; 
1999; 1998). Additionally, the efficiency scores produced by the DEA strongly depend on each other statistically 
and as a result, relying on such scores might lead to inaccurate interpretations. This is because a DEA efficiency 
score is a comparative efficiency index, instead of an absolute efficiency index and the statistical properties of the 
DEA, therefore, cannot be obtained since efficiency scores are estimated rather than calculated (Assaf et al., 2011). 
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across two key regions: the MENA and ASEAN which are characterized by a high 
concentration of Muslim majority populations and a fast-growth of Takaful. 
 Taken together, our findings provide important policy implications to investors, regulators 
and other market participants engaged in both the Takaful and conventional insurance 
industries. For example, we highlight that a mechanism such as the SSB, which ultimately 
distinguishes Islamic corporate governance from its conventional counterpart, performs a 
pivotal role in the efficiency of Takaful operators. We also provide strong evidence showing 
the effect of global market jurisdictions on the efficiency of these operators. In particular, our 
findings reveal the presence of significant association between firm location and Takaful 
operators’ efficiencies. Operators located in established and well-regulated markets tend to be 
technically better off. In contrast, regulatory environment does not improve scale efficiency, 
but actually worsens it. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses background on the 
Takaful market. Section 3 outlines the study’s hypotheses. Section 4 provides a discussion of 
the study data and sample, while Section 5 presents our methodology. Results are discussed in 
Section 6 with Section 7 reporting additional analyses. Finally, Section 8 concludes the study 
and highlights the policy implications. 
 
2. Background on the Takaful Industry 
Takaful insurance is cooperative in nature where the insurer assists participants or 
contributors to provide protection against unforeseen occurrence. Since its inception in the late 
1970s in Malaysia and South East Asia followed by a marked growth in the Gulf state countries, 
Takaful has experienced unparalleled growth especially over the last decade.  Global Takaful 
expanded substantially between the period 2004 and 2007, from a contribution of US$2.1 
billion to US$3.4 billion, equivalent to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of about 30%, 
with the largest markets being Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. Regionally, the ASEAN region has 
been characterized as the biggest market for the period 2005-2008. In 2008-2010, adjusted for 
global inflation, the sector grew at 28% as against the conventional market which stood at 5% 
in the respective Muslim countries and 8% in the MENA regions during the same period (Ernst 
& Young, 2014). 
Overall, global Takaful premiums are expected to have exceeded US$14 billion following 
its continuous increase from US$12.3 billion in the previous year (Ernst & Young, 2014). Even 
though the sector experienced a slight reduction in growth between 2007 and 2011, the growth 
rate between 2012 and 2014 remained healthy at 15%. Considering the continuous growth and 
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development of the Takaful sector, it is believed that by contributing to understanding the 
technical efficiency and its contributing factors, this study assists in allowing greater 
comprehension of the dealings of Takaful firms which could be beneficial to industry 
regulators, policyholders, shareholders and various industry stakeholders. This will help them 
make well-informed decisions regarding investment and risk management. 
 
3. Hypothesis development 
 In today’s corporations, where block-ownership is widely held, agency theory holds that 
managerial activities deviate from those necessary to maximize shareholder profits (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1985; Berle & Means, 1932). Thus, the need for corporate governance (CG) 
mechanisms emerges due to such agency problems. With an effective CG system in place, 
shareholders could be assured that managers utilize their funds efficiently and pursue their 
interests of achieving a reasonable return on their investment (Zheka, 2005).  
 
 
3.1 Non-Executive Directors (NEXECS): According to Fama and Jensen (1983b), non-
executive directors monitor managers better because they deeply value the maintenance of their 
reputation in the corporate world. The literature on the effects of non-executives on 
performance is inconclusive. One strand of the literature contends that the presence of external 
directors on a firm’s board reduces agency problems and lessens conflict of interest. For 
example, Klein (2002) argues that earnings quality increases with the ratio of external directors 
on the board, Rosenstein & Wyatt (1990) report a positive excess return on a firm’s stock 
following the announcement of an external director appointment to the board. Meanwhile, 
Perry & Shivdasani (2005) indicate that companies with more external directors report higher 
financial performance. This is consistent with Wang et al. (2007) study which highlights a 
positive relationship between the ratio of external directors and cost efficiency of Taiwanese 
non-life insurers. Similar results are obtained by Hardwick et al. (2011). On the other strand of 
the literature, Kader et al. (2014) indicate a negative correlation between outside directors and 
cost efficiency of Takaful firms, which is consistent with the finding of Coles et al. (2008) in 
relation to the conventional insurance industry. Nevertheless, literature on the effect of outside 
directors on the technical efficiency of Takaful firms is scarce. Hence, in line with the above 
arguments, we predict a positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors 
and the technical efficiency of Takaful firms. 
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3.2 Audit Committee (AUDIT): Primarily, the role of an audit committee is to supervise 
financial reporting, internal audit and control processes to certify that accounting information 
is unbiased. Furthermore, other authors (such as Menon and Williams, 1994) believe that the 
audit committee perform many crucial corporate governance functions and advice firms on 
both regulatory and operational matters as well as facilitate the prompt release of objective 
accounting information to stakeholders thereby reducing agency problem and information 
asymmetry between internal and external parties. Firm managers may also achieve efficiencies 
with the help of audit committees through their role of identifying poor operating practices and 
resource wastage, advising on matters of risk and uncertainty. In addition to strengthening the 
internal audit function; it is also frequently entrusted with scrutinizing the cost-benefit side of 
internal control system to ensure shareholders yield positive returns from the operation. This 
can undoubtedly reduce agency problems in Takaful firms because it can help in enhancing the 
quality of financial reporting (Hardwick et al., 2011). Hence, we expect the presence of audit 
committee on the board to positively affect the scale and technical efficiencies of Takaful 
operators.  
3.3 CEO/Chairman Position (CEO): The concentration of power of CEO and the chair 
position in one individual, as argued by Jensen (1993), affords too much authority to the 
individual and could impair decision-making in minority shareholder’s best interest. Studies 
have provided conflicting results on the importance of CEO duality. Individuals who retain 
both positions tend to exert considerable influence over the appointment of board members, 
thereby selecting outsiders who are unlikely to perform their monitoring and controlling roles 
effectively (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). This view is supported by Yermack (1996) who 
views CEO-Chair duality to decrease board independence. Pi and Timme (1993) show that 
within the U.S. context, return on assets and cost efficiency are lower for banks where the CEO 
serves as a chair. Kader et al. (2014) indicate that CEO-Chair duality has a negative effect on 
the cost efficiency of Takaful firms. Hardwick et al. (2011) show that separation of these 
positions has a positive effect on profit efficiency, nonetheless, in the presence of an audit 
committee and a low proportion of outside directors, that effect appears to be negative and 
marginally significant. Indeed, an alternative view maintains that separation of these roles can 
make decision-making problematic when two individuals fail to settle on strategies.  In an 
earlier study, Brickley et al. (1997) find that separating these key roles has potential costs and 
benefits, with the costs larger than the benefits. Rogers (2002) also reveals that separating the 
chair position from the CEO decreases the possibility of high cash flow volatility resulting 
from extreme risk-taking. These mixed results suggest that CEO/Chair separation is an 
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important determinant of efficiency in insurance industries in general terms. We therefore, 
conjecture, in line with prior literature, that technical and scale efficiencies of Takaful firms 
are expected to be higher where these roles are separated. 
 
3.4 Board Size (BSIZE): Prior studies have argued that board size can play a significant role 
in deciding how effective the governance of an institution is (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Raheja, 2005). After all, large boards are capable of providing additional 
skills, extensive networking and increased monitoring ability. In contrast, smaller boards 
reduce the risks of conflict and disagreement among directors (Hardwick et al., 2011). Jensen 
(1993) contend that due to issues such as coordination, flexibility in decision making and 
control, the effectiveness of large corporate boards tend to be less. This argument is supported 
by Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998). Both studies indicate that companies with 
smaller boards report a better performance. Other studies have, nevertheless, given 
contradicting evidence by stating the fact that larger boards are capable of bringing more 
expertise to the firm and increased supervision of managers. For multi-segment organization, 
Coles et al. (2008) find that performance is positively influenced by a large board. Hardwick 
et al. (2011) finds no support for effect of board size on profit efficiency of UK life insurance 
firms while Kader et al. (2014) show a positive association with the cost efficiency of Takaful 
firms. However, the influence of board size on the technical efficiency of Takaful firms is 
unresolved in the empirical literature. Accordingly, consistent with Pearce & Zahra (1992), we 
predict a positive relationship between size and technical efficiency. This implies that larger 
boards promote higher efficiency given that more board members bring additional knowledge 
and expertise which could improve fund/resource allocations. 
 
3.5 Ownership Structure (OWN): Ownership structure, particularly director ownership, is a 
core governance mechanism which could align the interests of managers and shareholders and 
hence, mitigate agency costs (Conheady et al., 2014). According to Zheka (2005), a firm’s 
ownership structure significantly affects managerial incentives, the process of decision-
making, monitoring and control systems and the overall financial performance. Grossman & 
Hart (1980) suggest that managers of companies with concentrated stockholding are subject to 
high monitoring and control by shareholders than their counterparts in companies with more 
dispersed ownership structures, where individual minority owners have incentives to free-ride 
on the monitoring expenditures of larger investors. Therefore, we contend that a positive 
relationship is predicted between concentrated ownership and technical efficiency of Takaful 
firms. 
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3.6 Shari’ah Supervisory Boards (SSB): Measured as the number of individuals on the SSB, 
this extra governance mechanism constitutes a crucial role in the Takaful market by making 
sure that business, financial, and investment issues (e.g. reserving, design of policy contracts, 
premium ratings etc.) conform to the laws prescribed by the Shari’ah  (Iqbal & Greuning, 
2008). Conversely, SSB can be viewed as a mechanism that promotes public trust as well as 
provide legitimacy to undertake Islamic finance and business (Mollah and Zaman, 2015). By 
attracting customers and investors, the performance of institutions tends to improve. We, 
therefore, predict a positive effect of SSB on the technical efficiency of Takaful firms.  
 
3.7 Firm Size (CPS): Researchers such as Cummins (1999) is of the opinion that a firm can 
achieve efficiency when it has a large market share (i.e. economies of scale due to its size). 
Meanwhile, Diacon, et al., (2002) also report that firm size affects efficiency in some European 
life insurance firms. However, Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that monitoring activity is more 
effective in smaller firms than larger ones. Hence, we test for the effect of firm size on the 
technical and scale efficiencies of Takaful firms.  
 
3.8 Macroeconomic factors (i.e., GDP and INF): According to Haley (1993), cyclical 
macroeconomic factors such as economic growth (GDP), interest rates and inflation affect the 
operational efficiency and the underwriting profitability of insurance firms. In high economic 
growth and interest rate periods, operators are likely to sustain losses due to the possible 
enhanced returns on their investments (in either the stock or bond markets). However, during 
inflationary periods, contributors claim may increase together with the level of prices generally. 
Also, cyclical macroeconomic factors may affect input prices; hence they may significantly 
influence the technical and scale efficiencies of Takaful operators. But due to the nature of the 
markets many of our sample firms are drawn from, we exclude interest rates (for example, 
Sudan and Iran run totally interest free economies while data on interest rates in Saudi Arabia 
and a host of other GCC countries is virtually non-existent). Therefore, taking this into account, 
we predict a positive effect from GDP and a negative effect from inflation on both types of 
inflation. 
 
3.9 Takaful insurance model and location (LOC): Generally, there appears to be a marked 
difference in markets with regards to tax policy, regulatory quality and the type of Takaful 
business model used. For example, countries in the GCC mostly run a tax free economy while 
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countries such as Malaysia offer tax advantages to Takaful operators which may help them 
become more scale efficient. Also, Abouzaid (2007) highlights those countries such as Sudan 
and Bahrain do not give managers the flexibility to choose the type of Takaful model to run 
while others such as Malaysia and the UAE empower managers to choose the business type. 
This can, therefore, have tendency to affect both technical and scale efficiencies of operators. 
Consequently, we predict that location will exert a positive and a non-directional effect on 
technical and scale efficiencies respectively. 
 
3.10 Governance/Institutional Quality (WGI/ICRG): It is well recognized that better 
governance in a country is believed to enhance overall productivity and efficiency in the 
country. This is according to several studies, for example, Olsen et al. (2000) observe that poor 
or bad institutions are often associated with slower efficiency and productivity while Hall and 
Jones (2000) opine that bad institutions reduce aggregate efficiency and productivity.  
Interestingly, in a study of an aspect of institutions, namely economic freedom, Adkins et al. 
(2002) shows that lack of economic freedom leads to lower aggregate efficiency while Meon 
and Weill (2005) are also of the view that better governance is related to greater efficiency. 
Hence, we predict a positive relationship between country governance and institutional quality 
and both types of efficiencies tested in this paper. 
 
3.11 Other control variables: Other firm specific factors can also influence the technical and 
scale efficiencies of Takaful operators. For the sake of this analysis, we control for the effect 
of organizational form/product offering, firm age and institutional ownership. We outline our 
motivation for using these variables below. 
According to Mayers and Smith (1981), the two major forms of business that dominate the 
insurance sector reflect the agency relationship that exists within the firm. Mayers et. al. (1997) 
also empirically show that in the insurance sector, the extent of agency incentive and the 
structure of the corporate board in firms is directly affected by the organizational form. 
Meanwhile, Cummins et al., (2004) supports empirically that stock type insurers in Spain are 
generally more efficient than mutual insurers. Takaful basically operates a mutual type 
insurance, however, product offering varies in the industry (i.e family and general Takaful) and 
besides, Harhoff et al., (1998) state that firms with a much less diversified product offering 
tend to have greater growth variability whilst others (like Byeongyong & Weiss (2005); 
Jovanovic, 1982) are of the opinion that firms with a less diversified product offering may be 
less efficient than those with several product lines. 
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Alternatively, researchers (such as Dunes & Hughes, 1994) have proposed that the life cycle 
effect of the firm (or age) may be a key determinant of growth in an industry. For example, 
younger firms with less experienced managers tend to be less technical and scale efficient than 
older ones. 
 
4. Data 
We use a comprehensive sample which includes 134 Takaful firms operating in 21 
countries7 which are characterized with high concentration of Muslim population for the period 
2002-2013. Data on Takaful insurers were collected from the World Islamic Insurance 
Directories (WIID). The WIID is initiated by Takaful Re (a leading global provider of Takaful 
services) and published by the Middle East Insurance Review (the publisher of Asia Insurance 
Review). Missing data were hand collected from annual reports of respective firms. The choice 
sample period was based on available information from the data source (i.e. WIID). 
Consistent with prior evidence, country governance data was collected from both the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) and the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) (Al-Marhubi, 
2004; Bjørnskov, 2006; Huynh & Jacho-chavez, 2009; Baltagi et al., 2009; Law and 
Habibullah, 2009; Law et al., 2013, 2014). To model the insurance product process, we follow 
Bhatty (2007) and categorize Takaful insurers of producing four main types of output: (i) 
vehicle insurance (ii) property insurance (iii) marine and aviation insurance and (iv) other 
insurance. Four inputs are used to produce these outputs: (i) Admin Expenses (ii) Labor Input 
(iii) Labor Expenses and (iv) Capital Assets. Appendix A presents our sample distribution and 
list of countries. 
 
5.  Methodology 
5.1 Efficiency Measurement 
This study uses the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method to estimate technical and 
scale efficiencies of Takaful insurers. In a number of service industries involving complex 
input-output relationships, DEA has been shown to be an effective tool for benchmarking 
(Cooper et al., 2007; Zhu, 2014)7 . In theory, DEA is a sound framework for studies on 
performance as it provides numerous advantages over orthodox approaches such as regression 
                                                                
7 The ratio analysis technique has been criticized on the grounds that various ratios may possibly denote the performance of a 
unit equivocally in various directions whilst the regression analysis technique presumes a form of functional correlation 
between inputs and outputs, and is able to handle only a single output at a time (Manandhar & Tang, 2002). Moreover, the 
weighted index technique also holds some defects due to the absence of an objective way in determining the weight for an 
unbiased allocation. 
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analysis and performance ratios (Schaffnit et al., 1997). DEA technically represents some set 
of linear programming, non-parametric technique utilized to construct empirical production 
frontiers to assess the relative efficiency of production units. This method effectively handles 
complex processes, where the units, usually termed decision making units, make use of 
multiple inputs and outputs (Schaffnit et al., 1997). 
The DEA technique also permits the evaluation of the performance of a unit and is 
undertaken by comparing its performance with that of the best performer parallel to the concept 
of efficiency. The performance measure is expressed in the form of an efficiency score 
(Manandhar & Tang, 2002). In this study, the principal DEA formulation presumes that the 
Takaful operators, each use different quantities of the inputs available to produce equally 
different amounts of outputs, under the assumptions of convexity, positive monotonicity, and 
free disposability of inputs and outputs for all observations (Kader et al., 2014). We apply an 
output oriented model assumption which can be derived for the ith Takaful insurer by solving 
the following: 
 
𝛿𝑖 = max
?̂?𝑖,𝜆
{𝛿 > 0I?̂?𝑖𝑦𝑖 ≤ ∑ 𝑌𝜆; 𝑥𝑖 ≥ ∑ 𝑋𝜆; ∑ 𝜆 = 1; 𝜆 ≥ 0
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 },       (1) 
  𝑖 = 1 … . . 𝑛 𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑎𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠    
   
Where, 
 Y is a vector of Takaful operator outputs, X is a vector of operator inputs, λ is a I × 1 vector of 
constants. The value of  𝛿𝑖  obtained is the technical efficiency score for the ith Takaful insurer. 
A score of  ?̂?𝑖 = 1 indicates that the operator is technically efficient, and otherwise, if the score 
is less than 1.  
This linear programming function must be solved n times, one for each Takaful operator in 
the sample. It should be noted that the DEA model can be estimated in two different ways: the 
variable return to scale and the constant return to scale assumptions. This study relies on the 
variable return to scale assumption only because the constant return to scale assumption is only 
accurate in a situation where the assumption is that Takaful insurers are operating at an optimal 
level of scale. This assumption (the CRS) is perhaps implausible because level of technology 
and regulation might differ across Takaful operators in different size groups and markets, so 
utilizing the VRS would allow the modeling to take into account these considerations. 
To estimate the efficiency of the ith Takaful firm, we utilise the profit frontier model 
consistent with Hardwick et al. (2011) which is specified as : 
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From equation (2), each company’s total profit is represented by ,  and  represents 
the total number of inputs and outputs.  stands for the input price (proxy by admin expenses, 
labor input, price of labor and capital input) for the  firm,  for the output (Marine and 
aviation insurance, property insurance, motor insurance, and other insurance) (i.e. gross 
premiums) of the ith firm, while  and  are the parameters to be measured. Consistency 
demands that  and  and linear homogeneity is ensured from normalization by 
the mth input price. While linear homogeneity is not a pre-requisite for a profit function, it 
represents a cost function (Hardwick et al., 2011). Furthermore, Berge et al. (2000) indicate 
that input prices are prone to positive correlation with output prices, and it is reasonable to 
assume that a doubling in profits and output prices is associated with doubling the input prices. 
 is a normally distributed, random error term with zero mean and constant variance, while u 
is presumed to follow a half-normal distribution, which is taken to be a sign of profit 
inefficiency. (u is presumed to be  0). 
 
5.2 The Bootstrap Approach 
Prior literature has been overwhelmed with debate concerning the statistical weakness of 
the DEA estimator. According to Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 2007), the efficiency scores 
produced by the DEA strongly depend on one another statistically and as a result, relying on 
them might lead to inaccurate interpretation of results. This is because the DEA efficiency 
score is a comparative efficiency index, instead of an absolute efficiency index and the 
statistical properties of the DEA cannot be obtained due to the fact that efficiency scores are 
not estimated but calculated (Assaf et al., 2011).  
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The bootstrap method was first used in obtaining statistical properties of the DEA by Simar 
and Wilson (1998)8. The authors extended their approach in a 2007 study by considering the 
effects of environmental variables on efficiency based on double bootstrap. This method allows 
consistent inference (in the second stage regression) from efficiency scores, while concurrently 
constructs confidence intervals and generates standard errors for DEA efficiency scores.  
In this study, we specifically employ the Simar and Wilson (2007) method due to its relative 
importance; among others, it generates a set of bias-corrected estimates of  𝛿𝑖 and confidence 
intervals which assists in resolving the problem of DEA which is occasionally criticized for its 
potential to produce bias efficiency estimates and its exclusion of random error. The bias-
corrected efficiency estimates are generally preferred over the original DEA estimates because 
the bias-corrected estimates are within the upper and lower bounds of the DEA bootstrap 
confidence interval while in contrast, the original DEA estimates do not show biasness in the 
scores (Lee, 2011). Details on a step-by-step analysis of estimating the bootstrap score is 
documented in prior studies (e.g. Barros and Assaf, 2009 ; Assaf et al., 2011; Barros and 
Garcia-del-Barrio, 2011). 
Our motivation for adopting the DEA bootstrap method further emerges from specifying the 
second stage regression model as follows: 
iii x  

 (3) 
  
Where,  
xi is a vector of governance characteristics that explain the efficiency between the Takaful 
insurers under consideration and β denotes a vector of parameters and i  refers to statistical 
noise (or the error term). Traditionally, factors that determine technical efficiency are estimated 
using Tobit regression, however, according to Simar and Wilson (2007), there exist a number 
of problems with two-stage studies that make use of non-parametric distance function 
estimators in the first stage (similar to ours) and then utilize Tobit regression in the second 
stage. Conducting a Monte Carlo simulation, we argue that a truncated regression is more 
suitable and gives accurate results.  
                                                                
8 The bootstrap method is also non-parametric like the DEA. As opposed to DEA in which the application of statistical 
inference is impossible due to its deterministic nature (i.e., there is no random error to introduce unexplained variability), the 
bootstrap allows this. In addition, the bootstrap DEA is asymptotically consistent and produces robust results. The bootstrap 
method is based on a simulation technique produced by replicating or iterating the original dataset 2000 times in order to obtain 
reliable estimates. The method was first introduced by Efron (1979).  
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Accordingly, we employ truncated regression to determine the effects of corporate 
governance mechanisms, institutional quality and macroeconomic conditions on the efficiency 
of the global Takaful industry. Table 1 presents our variable definitions. 
 
 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents our descriptive statistics for the overall sample (Panel A); the MENA 
region (Panel B); and the ASEAN region (Panel C). For the overall sample, board size (BSIZE) 
reports a mean of over seven members which is less than the maximum reported  by Jensen 
(1993), which recommended eight members. This average is also considered smaller than those 
reported for the US, UK and Taiwanese property liability insurance market, life insurance 
market, and life & non-life insurance market by Huang et al., (2011); Hardwick et al., (2011) 
and Wang et al., (2007) who reported 11, above 8 and 11 respectively for the three countries. 
On average, the board is comprised of four non-executive directors (NEXECS) and a maximum 
of ten members. Interestingly, this ratio is similar to the 37 percent and 40 percent composition 
of outside directors reported in 2011 and 1992 for the UK life and non-life insurance firms by 
O’Sullivan and Diacon, (2003) and Hardwick et al., (2011) but is much higher than the 11 
percent reported for family Takaful providers by Kader et al., (2014). When comparing the 
ratios between non-executives in family Takaful providers and overall Takaful providers, our 
results show that general Takaful providers use significantly more outside directors than those 
offering only the family segment. This may be explained due to the wider product offering 
which might require additional expertise with other product lines of insurance compared to 
those only offering a single product.  
Interestingly, our results show that more than 88 percent of Takaful providers separate the 
role of Chairman and CEO; with 24 percent of these firms located in markets with established 
regulatory systems, 95 percent offer both family and general Takaful products, 72 percent with 
3 shareholders with investments above 5 percent, 24 percent reporting an established audit 
committee with an average of 4 members per each SSB. In terms of Takaful experience, most 
of the firms in our sample have, on average, been operating for 13 years, with 73 percent having 
institutional investors. 
Based on our regional analysis, firms from the MENA have a mean board size of 8 members 
which is as recommended by Jensen (1993) but smaller compared to those reported in the US, 
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UK and Taiwanese insurance sector reported above. Their board is made up of 4 non-executive 
directors on average which takes a considerably low proportion of the maximum number of 
board members (which is 16). This is similar to those reported for the UK insurance sector in 
2011 and 1992. This study also finds that 86 percent of the firms consider separating the Chair 
office from the CEO important while only 17 percent regard audit committee to be significant, 
with 68 percent having institutional investors. In addition, 99 percent of firms diversify their 
product line, offering family and other forms of Takaful, with over 68 percent having 3 
shareholders who own shares above 5 percent. With respect to the SSB in the MENA Takaful 
sector, the average number of members is 2, with most of the firms being in existence for more 
than 13 years. Additionally, the MENA region reports very low in relation to governance and 
institutional quality with the former average running in the negative out of a score of 6 while 
the latter averaging 16 (out of a total score of 30). Economic growth in the region is, however, 
stable along with the inflation rate which averages 7 percent. 
Conversely, Takaful firms from the South East Asia region (ASEAN) have a much higher 
board composition of 23 members with a mean size of four. The number of board members 
comprise of an average of 4 non-executives with a maximum of 9. Moreover, 42 percent of the 
firms report having an audit committee which is higher than that reported for the MENA region. 
In addition, while 95 percent of the operators in the region separate the CEO from the Chair, 
82 percent of firms in this region have a diversified product line offering different types of 
Takaful with approximately 84 percent of the operators owned by investors with shares over 5 
percent. The mean Shari’ah board size in this market is 4 with more than 87 percent of firms 
having institutional investors. However, the governance and institutional landscape in the sub 
region did not fare better than that reported for the MENA (having scored -0.6 and 18.75 
respectively). In terms of macroeconomic environment, both economic growth and inflation in 
the region is appears similar to that witnessed in MENA.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the second stage regression 
indicates that the ratio of non-executives is negatively related to both technical efficiency (TE) 
and scale efficiency (SE). This demonstrates that non-executives on the board are detrimental 
to the efficiency of Takaful firms, as does audit committee and board size which is consistent 
with expectation. In addition, the positive relationship between CEO separation and TE shows 
that firms with separate CEO and chairmanship positions are better in terms of management. 
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Also, firm size (in natural log form), location, and institutional shareholding are all positively 
related to the efficiency scores signifying that larger Takaful firms located in jurisdictions with 
an established regulatory framework and partly owned by institutions tend to be more efficient 
(as is evident in the positive correlation among all these variables). The correlation coefficients 
between the various board characteristics and the efficiency scores appear to be modest. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
6.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
We report the original DEA, FDH and Order M scores in Tables 4 and 5 respectively. The 
efficiency estimates of the different Takaful insurers obtained from iterating the DEA score 
2000 times are reported in Table 6 to enable comparison with the original DEA estimates.  
 
A. Technical Efficiency Based on DEA Estimator 
Table 4 below presents the summary of the Takaful firms’ mean efficiency scores as well as 
the disaggregated technical efficiency scores based on TE (variable returns to scale), and SE 
under the Takaful sector for the full, MENA and ASEAN samples. In short, the TE estimates 
indicate that all firms appear to operate between an efficiency range of 0.015 and 1.00 with a 
mean score of 0.51. On average, global Takaful firms operate at 51 percent efficiency, which 
also translates into an inefficiency ratio of 49 percent. Furthermore, the average efficiency 
estimate indicates that under present operating technology, Takaful firms can potentially 
withdraw the supply of inputs by 49 percent and still attain the same level of output. This result 
implies low prospects of withdrawing the supply of inputs to increase efficiency. The wide 
efficiency range reported offers some evidence that there is substantial variation in return 
among firms. In other words, Takaful insurers seem to operate at comparatively different levels 
of return. This is relatively lower than the result reported by Kader et al. (2010, 2014) who 
reported 74 and 62 percent respectively. However, this is justified and in line with Tziogkidis 
(2014) who asserts that owing to diversity in group of firms and time period, it is possible to 
obtain different results even when employing the same efficiency measurement techniques. 
On the other hand, our SE estimates are low, ranging between 0.02 and 1.00 with a mean 
score of 0.44. This score is also lower than those obtained by Kader et al. (2010, 2014). 
Following Padilla-Fernandez & Nuthall (2009), which compare their findings to the TE scores, 
having low scale efficiency score suggests that the small size of the industry or firms operating 
in the industry appear to be the main cause of inefficiency rather than the presence of 
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managerial problems. Therefore, a good approach to improve efficiency in the Takaful sector 
is to increase the size of the industry, which would encourage greater competition and possible 
consolidation. 
Arguably, the high inefficiency level estimate under the two assumptions is plausible as 
many of these Takaful firms are relatively new and small9, with only several years of experience 
could be a rationale for high technical inefficiency. Huang et al. (2011) attribute high efficiency 
in insurance companies largely to the advancement in technology and modes of operation. This 
undoubtedly suggests that Takaful operators have yet to benefit from the advantages of new 
technology and recent best practices in the industry. A further reason for high technical 
inefficiency could be attributed to the hypothesis surrounding the DEA estimator. According 
to De Witte & Marques (2010) the DEA estimator is not robust to noise, therefore other factors 
(such as institutional factors) which may improve efficiency or increase inefficiency (factors 
beyond Takaful industry control) may not be estimated using DEA. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
B. Technical Efficiency Based on FDH and Order-M Estimators 
Based on the weaknesses of the DEA mentioned above, we consider other efficiency 
estimators to increase the robustness of the scores. Table 5, therefore, presents TE estimates 
based on the Free Disposal Hull (FDH) and Order-M estimators for the Takaful industry. The 
FDH estimator indicates that Takaful firms operate from 0 to 1.00 with mean efficiency level 
of 58.3 percent indicating that on average; all Takaful firms operate at 58 percent efficiency, 
but displaying potential for 42 percent inefficiency level. This result is anticipated because 
FDH relaxes the convexity assumption, thus inclining towards higher scores compared to the 
DEA estimator whose production is extremely convex. Several researchers  (such as Borger et 
al., 1994; De Witte & Marques, 2010) compare between the FDH and DEA estimators, using 
the same data set, and obtained lower DEA estimates against those from the FDH. This can be 
attributable to the divergence in convexity assumption10. The result from the Order-M estimates 
                                                                
9 Where Technical efficiency score is higher than scale efficiency, it is likely that the major cause of inefficiency is size. See 
Padilla-Fernandez and Nuthall (2012). 
10 According to Levin & Milgron (2004) the convexity assumption fails in cases where there are fixed costs of production or 
where the production sets exhibits increasing returns. Their findings suggest that comparative statics conclusions are largely 
independent of convexity assumptions and they solve for the problem of comparative statics using methods that do not rely on 
convexity. 
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show that the efficiency level of the industry ranges between 0.00 and 1.00, providing a mean 
score of 0.51 indicating 51 percent efficiency level. 
Therefore, comparing the TE results under the three estimators (DEA, Order-M and FDH) 
is imperative in order to accommodate the shortcomings of each of the estimators. As noted 
earlier, each of the estimators has its strength and weakness. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
C. Homogeneous Smoothed Bootstrap  
We further conduct and estimate homogeneous smoothed bootstrap for optimizing TE. Such 
analyses are based on the simulation technique produced by replicating or iterating the original 
dataset. The results presented in Table 6 report the bootstrap outcome on the non-bias corrected 
efficiency (original DEA scores). Our findings indicate that the bias corrected TE score for the 
Takaful industry ranges between 0.001 and 1.00 with an average efficiency level of 0.47; 
implying 47 percent efficiency level. Therefore, subtracting the bias corrected efficiency score 
from the non-bias corrected TE result yields the bias estimate score. 
The bias estimates account for factors beyond Takaful operators control such as regulatory 
changes, institutional factors, external shocks to the (financial) market and other policy factors. 
The higher the mean bias estimate, the higher is the noise in the system, which is generally 
beyond the control of operators. For the Takaful industry, this is attributable to a lack of sound 
regulatory framework as these firms operate under similar exogenous factors; such as a single 
main regulatory body to scrutinize industry practices, shocks to the global financial 
environment, except additional market (country) level regulations. Furthermore, many of the 
firms used in the sample operate in jurisdictions with weak regulatory frameworks and poor 
institutional quality. The above-mentioned observations on regulation, institution and 
dependency are the inferences that account for high noise or bias in the efficiency of the 
industry. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the non-bias corrected TE score was estimated 
following the conventional DEA approach with a simulation effect in it, which does not account 
for the noise component of the DEA. The bias corrected TE takes care of the noise which 
correlates with the bias. Consequently, the bias corrected yields a lower score relative to the 
non-bias corrected. 
Moreover, the evidence presented in Table 4 (full sample) shows a high degree of scale 
inefficiency in operation across the industry with a mean SE score of 0.39 indicating that the 
industry is scale inefficient; essentially, the industry is 61 percent away from the scale frontier. 
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It is also noteworthy that the VRS (TE) score of 47 percent is higher than the SE score. This 
demonstrates that the main cause of inefficiency seems to be less related to technical issues 
(like management) but more scale related. This further implies that the increase in (technical) 
efficiency is possible through increasing the scale of operation in the industry (size of firms). 
This is expected due to the fact that many firms operating in the industry are small (compared 
to conventional insurance firms) or operating through a window. Therefore, the zero frontiers 
assumption surrounding the DEA-bootstrap estimation is unsurprising. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
D. Determinants of Technical Efficiency  
The results of our truncated regression are reported in Tables 7a (with institutional 
ownership control) and 7b (without institutional ownership control). In each of the regressions, 
the bias corrected TE scores are used as the dependent variable.  
In Table 7a, in relation to the ratio of non-executives (NEXECS) serving on boards, our 
results show a negative and highly significant effect on the TE of the global Takaful firms. This 
finding is consistent with prior evidence reported in both Takaful (see Kader et al., 2010, 2014) 
and conventional insurance studies such as, Coles et al. (2008) and Pathan and Faff (2013). 
When we interact non-executive and board size (N EXECS*BSIZE), we find a positive and 
significant association with TE implying that non-executive directors may facilitate the 
attainment of TE in Takaful firms, due to their financial expertise, networking in the insurance 
industry as well as their backgrounds in risk management. In contrast, under the SE 
measurement the coefficient on the NEXECS variable is positive and significant, suggesting 
that those external directors are indeed effective contributors to SE of Takaful operators. 
However, the interaction between NEXECS and BSIZE generates a negative and significant 
coefficient suggesting that non-executive directors serving on large boards might still impair 
the actualization of SE in the industry. When examining the effect of audit committees, the 
presence of an audit committee member on the board can reduce the TE of Takaful insurers, 
albeit insignificantly. This demonstrates that in a board where there is separation of board 
chairman and CEO positions and a presence of a large board, the need for extra supervision 
may be minimized. Hence, this reduces the added advantage of an audit committee. In terms 
of the control variables, disputing prediction, ownership is found to be negative but statistically 
insignificant to both technical and scale efficiencies of Takaful insurers. However, when 
institutional ownership is excluded (as shown in Table 7b), the coefficient becomes positive 
but statistically insignificant to TE but significant at 5 percent to scale efficiency. This finding 
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suggests that individual owners tend to pay less attention to their monitoring role where an 
institution owns a substantial part of the firm. This situation may be because established 
institutions give considerable attention to monitoring their investments in other entities. This 
relationship is also similar on the scale efficiency, which may also suggest that individual 
shareholders may show more interest in maximizing their wealth instead of value. This result 
is in line with  Huang et al. (2011) and Mura (2006). 
 For the separation of chairman and CEO positions, the coefficient on the CEO shows a 
positive and significant effect on both TE and SE of Takaful insurers. These results consistent 
with our predictions and imply that it is possible that in a situation where the positions are held 
by a single individual, the holder becomes too powerful to be supervised by other members of 
the board, especially the non-executive members. This result also highlights the importance of 
separating these strategic positions to promote high performance of the Takaful industry. Our 
findings are in line with the agency theory and with prior studies (such as Wang et al., 2007; 
Jermias & Gani, 2014; Pi & Timme, 1993). In contrast, when interacting the CEO and board 
size variable, the effects becomes negative and highly significant; suggesting that separation 
of power in large boards could negatively impair TE of Takaful firms. 
With board size (BSIZE), our result shows a positive and significant association with TE 
and supports the findings of Pearce and Zahra (1992) who argue that larger boards are more 
profitable thereby increasing TE given their expertise in fund and resource 
management/allocations. Essentially, our findings show no significant influence of the impact 
of board size on SE.  
In addition, our results do not reveal a significant relationship between institutional 
ownership (OWN) and the SSB to technical efficiency of Takaful operators. Nevertheless, the 
negative coefficient on the SSB is unsurprising because not only is the SSB an additional 
monitoring and oversight mechanism, but it is also seen as a constraint on the operations of 
Islamic financial institutions (see Mollah & Zaman, 2015), however, they have a positive and 
significant effect at 1 percent to their scale efficiency. This reveals that the SSB gives the 
operator the much needed (religious) ethical and social legitimacy, prompting individuals to 
subscribe to the venture and shareholders to invest in the firm. 
Our regression further delineates that firm size (in natural log form) is likely to exert a 
positive and statistically significant influence on technical efficiency (at the 5 percent level) 
which is consistent with our prediction, indicating that larger operators are more technically 
efficient than smaller sized operators. This for example may arise due to the fact that the size 
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of a company may increase its operational efficiency by means of economies of scale11. 
Similarly, the relationship is also likely to be significant to scale efficiency at 5 percent. 
Also, our regression results demonstrate that older firms are more technically efficient, 
where the relationship between age and efficiency is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level. The regression supports the view that firms located in markets with established 
regulatory frameworks are more technically efficient at 1 percent but are less scale efficient. 
This suggests that Takaful operators in countries such as Malaysia, Bahrain, and the U.A.E find 
it more difficult to increase their scale of production (or expand) due to prescribed regulations. 
Evidently, Takaful insurers that specialize in a single product offering (for example family 
Takaful) are found to be more technically efficient but less scale efficient. This arises because 
managers become more familiar and highly skilled where there is a specialization on a single 
product rather than dealing with many. This may also affect the size of the firm in that a firm 
tends to be bigger when producing and offering diverse products and services. 
Table 7(a) and 7(b) depicts several macroeconomic (i.e., GDP and inflation) and governance 
variables. It shows that economic growth in a country tends to significantly enhance both 
technical and scale efficiencies of Takaful firms at the 1 percent level. However, while better 
governance is significantly associated with better technical efficiency (at the 10 percent level) 
but is insignificant to scale efficiency. This is similar to the study of Meon and Weill (2005) 
who find that better governance is generally linked with greater efficiency. 
[Insert Tables 7a & 7b here] 
 
 
7. Additional analyses  
 
This study employs an alternative indicator for country governance as robustness check for 
the second stage regression and we report the results in Table 8a and 8b respectively. Here, we 
substitute the WGI with the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) institutional quality 
indicators. This monthly dataset is obtained from Political Risk Services (PRS), a world leader 
in quant-driven political risk and country risk forecasts. Following Law et al. (2013 and 2014), 
three PRS indicators are employed to measure institutional quality, namely: (i) Government 
Stability (ii) Democratic Accountability and (iii) Bureaucratic Quality; the first indicator is 
scaled from 0-12 while the second and last are 0-6 and 0-4 respectively, with higher values 
                                                                
11 For example, see Diacon et al. (2002) 
23 
 
demonstrating better institutions while aggregating them into a single measure by adding up12. 
Owing to their different scaling method, we re-scaled them appropriately13, hence, the 
theoretical range of our institutional quality index is 0-30. As shown in Tables 8a/8b below, all 
the coefficients on the variables have the expected size and show similar significance and is 
consistent with our main findings. This suggests that results are robust to the alternative 
indicators. 
 
[Insert Tables 8a & 8b here] 
 
We also deemed it worthwhile to extend our analyses to cluster our full sample into the 
MENA and ASEAN countries to identify any regional effect for the impact of governance on 
Takaful efficiency. Our results are reported in Appendix B. 
  Our efforts reveal that geographic location also appear to have direct influence CG 
mechanisms have on operators’ efficiency. For example, a proportion of non-executive 
directors, separation of CEO and Chair positions and organizational form all tend to 
significantly reduce technical efficiency while firm age, inflation, size, economic growth and 
governance significantly increase technical efficiency in the MENA region. A one percent 
increase in the proportion of non-executives on the board reduces the technical efficiency of 
these firms by 3 percent. A surprising result in this analysis is the positive and significant 
coefficient on inflation because Haley (1993) is of the opinion that inflation undermines the 
operational efficiency and underwriting profitability of insurers. SSB is also negative but 
insignificant to technical efficiency of operators in this region. Regarding the scale efficiency, 
factors such as board size, SSB, firm age, organizational form and institutional ownership are 
positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates the relative importance of 
product specialization on the continuous growth of the Takaful sector. Country governance or 
institutional quality is also positive, but weakly significant at the 10 percent level. However, 
presence of audit committee on the board as well as inflation negatively affects scale efficiency 
of MENA operators in a significant manner. The negative coefficient on inflation here is 
predictable because Takaful is a form of savings and investment, and inflation erodes 
purchasing power and according to Li et al. (2007), inflation affects the demand for insurance 
                                                                
12 According to Knack and Keefer (1995), there exists high correlation among these indicators which may result 
in multi-collinearity. For fear of omitting any of them from the estimation, the 3 institutional quality variables are 
summed together as one. 
13 The variables are converted to 0-10 by multiplying the first by 5/6, the next 1 by 5/3 and the last by 5/2 to unify 
them. 
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products and by extension, the growth of the sector. Additionally, inflation also causes 
uncertainty because the value of money changes during inflationary periods, planning for 
retirement or future use of money (as in the case of insurance) becomes difficult. This effect 
may be cushioned by interest rates; however, Takaful operators do not deal in interest. 
Curiously, technical efficiency of operators in ASEAN is negatively affected by the 
presence of an audit committee member serving on the board, inflation, country governance or 
institutional infrastructure, SSB, board size and institutional ownership, however, only country 
governance appears to be significant albeit weakly (at 10% level). This is, indeed, surprising 
because according to Meon and Weill (2005) better governance is often associated with greater 
efficiency in a country. Factors such as separation of CEO and Chairman improve TE in a 
significant manner while firm age and location softly improves technical efficiency of Takaful 
firms. Economic growth, firm size and organizational form are also found to be positive. In 
contrast, ratio of non-executive directors, board size, ownership structure, firm location, 
product specialization, and inflation all appear to be detrimental to the scale efficiency of 
Takaful operators in South East Asia while audit committee, separation of office, SSB, firm 
age, institutional ownership, economic growth and governance  positively affects scale 
efficiency. However, only audit committee, SSB and country governance were found to be 
significant. In particular, the negative coefficient on the SSB in both regional analyses further 
supports the assertion of Mollah and Zaman (2015) that not only are SSB an added layer of 
monitoring and oversight, they are also regarded as a constraint on the operations of IFIs. 
Nevertheless, the positive and significant coefficients on the scale efficiency of operators in 
both regions highlight the importance of the SSB in fulfilling the legitimacy and modus 
operandi of Takaful operators. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This study extends conventional and Islamic corporate governance literature by examining 
the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and technical and scale 
efficiencies of global Takaful operators. Using a comprehensive sample of 134 Takaful insurers 
in 21 countries for the period 2002 to 2013, our study finds Takaful insurers to be inefficient 
suggesting possible managerial and operational apathy. We also find that non-executive 
directors, audit committees, and product diversification do not improve technical efficiency. 
Whilst, CEO/chair duality, board size, organizational age, regulatory jurisdiction and firm size 
have a positive relationship with technical efficiency, non-executive directors, Shari’ah board, 
product diversification and institutional ownership are found to improve scale efficiency. Our 
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study incorporates new evidence relating to the (MENA) and the Southeast East Asian 
(ASEAN) regions. We find that in the MENA, both ownership structure and CEO/chair duality 
significantly reduces technical efficiency with board size indicating a negative association for 
scale efficiency.  Within the ASEAN region, only the CEO/chair duality significantly relates 
with technical efficiency with audit committees and SSB size displaying a positive association 
with scale efficiency. 
Our findings could be of potential benefit to policy makers, investors and other market 
participants as well as informing future research on the efficiencies of Takaful operators. For 
instance, examining corporate governance determinants that influences the likelihood of 
efficient performance in this alternative and fast growing insurance industry provides strong 
evidence on the importance of separating the CEO and chair positions and its role in improving 
technical efficiency. A comparative evaluation with the conventional insurance industry would 
also provide valuable evidence on the level of progress of this alternative insurance sector. 
Overall, this study finds that the ratio of non-executives on the board engenders technical 
inefficiency in Takaful firms. However, board size is shown to have positive association with 
both technical and scale efficiencies, suggesting that larger operators are more likely to 
promote higher efficiency than small operators. Furthermore, product specialization appears to 
drive Takaful inefficiency, demonstrating that Takaful firms are not fully realizing economies 
of scope. Finally, firms in established jurisdictions appear to benefit more technically, but do 
not benefit in terms of scale of operation. This shows that regulations in established markets 
are hampering the growth of the industry. This is becoming more evident due to the pressures 
of new initiatives issued by regulators, low Takaful penetration, composite license regulations 
and the requirement to maintain adequate capitalization. Undoubtedly, this will have a 
profound effect on the Takaful landscape. For these reasons, we surmise that mergers and 
acquisitions, perhaps through international foreign participation, will become inevitable 
especially if the industry is to continue to grow and support itself. This may be through 
consolidation intended to create a stronger, sustainable and a more resilient platform as 
currently experienced in several markets such as in Malaysia and the GCC. For now, our study 
raises some pertinent issues that future researchers can build on. 
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TABLE 1: Variable definitions 
 
Variables Notations Definition Data Source  
Non-Executives NEXECS This are the outside, independent directors on the board. This variable is measured as the ratio of non-executive 
directors on the board  
WIID, firms annual 
reports 
Audit Committee AUDIT Presence of auditors on the board. Measured as the dummy, with a firm taking 1 if there exists an audit committee 
on the board and 0 otherwise 
WIID and company 
annual reports 
CEO CEO The separation of the CEO and chairman positions. Measured as the dummy, with a firm taking 1 if there exists an 
audit committee on the board and 0 otherwise 
WIID and company 
annual reports 
Board Size  BSIZE Size of the board of directors.  Measured as the total number of individuals on the board WIID and company 
annual reports 
Ownership 
Structure 
OWN Directors block ownership. The ratio of shares held by the top three. WIID and company 
annual reports 
Shari’ah Board SSB The number of individuals on the Shari’ah board.  WIID and company 
annual reports 
Location LOC Country where operator is based Measured as dummy, with a firm taking 1 if is located in established markets 
(Malaysia, UAE, Indonesia, KSA and Bahrain) and 0 otherwise. 
WIID  
AGE AGE Age of the firm. The difference between the sample year and the year of a firm’s first appearance. WIID 
Organizational 
form  
ORG Type of product offered by operator. Measured as dummy where a firm carries 1 if offers only family Takaful and 
0 if it offers both general and family Takaful 
WIID 
Institutional 
ownership 
INSOWN Operators partly owned by other institutions. The ratio of shares held by an institution.  WIID 
Company Size CPS This is the size of the Takaful operator measured as natural logarithm of company profit WIID 
Institutional 
quality 
INSQ This is an assessment of the strength of political institutions and risk factors in a country. Represents the sum of 
rule of law, corruption, democratic accountability, government stability, and bureaucratic quality (each scaled 0 to 
10) 
ICRG 
Country 
Governance 
WGI  This variable measures the quality of governance in over 200 countries. Sum of control of corruption, rule of law, 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness, political stability, as well as voice and accountability (each scaled 0-
6).  
WGI, World Bank 
Inflation INF Annual rate of inflation. World Bank 
GDP GDP Annual Gross Domestic Products (GDP) growth rate.  World Bank 
Output 1 - Vehicle insurance. Total amount of contributions received for vehicle insurance WIID 
33 
 
Output 2 - Property insurance. Total amount of contributions received for property insurance WIID 
Output 3 - Marine and Aviation Insurance. Total amount of contributions received for marine and aviation insurance.  WIID 
Output 4 - Other Insurance. Total amount of contributions received for other insurance such as health, family, fire, etc. WIID 
Input 1 - Administrative expenses incurred by the operator including but not limited to cost of general services.  WIID 
Input 2 - Labor Input. Total number of labor utilized by the operator in a given calendar year. WIID 
Input 3 - Labor Expenses. Total amount of salaries paid to staff in the firm WIID 
Input 4 - Capital Assets. Pieces of properties owned and investments held by the operator in a given year WIID 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
Variables Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Output1 689 10300000 11300000 1001.001 16200000 
Output2 689 864017.4 6315348 1001 73500000 
Output3 689 997454.9 9268698 1001.001 18000000 
Output4 689 1883508 1970000 1001.001 41100000 
Input1 689 1232207 1050000 1001.001 20400000 
Input2 689 267.344 513.7519 12 4001 
Input3 689 6811.633 39970.51 1001 650748.8 
Input4 689 5812735 40000000 1001.152 65000000 
NEXECS 690 4.31 2.07 0 10 
AUDIT 690 0.24 0.42 0 1 
CEO  690 0.88 0.32 0 1 
BSIZE 690 7.40 2.81 1 23 
OWN 689 72.23 27.45 8.01 100 
SHARB 681 2.83 2.05 0 17 
LOC 690 0.24 0.43 0 1 
AGE 690 12.90 12.58 0 70 
ORG 689 0.95 0.23 0 1 
INSTOWN 689 72.83 33.30 0 100 
LSIZE 686 5.52 0.98 0 6.52 
INF 668 6.85 5.59 -4.86 37.39 
GDP 684 25.30 1.13 22.14 26.94 
INSQ 685 16.74 2.89 11.53 23.75 
WGI 690 -1.04 2.48 -5.36 3.41 
Panel B: MENA Sample 
Variables Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Output1 538 1290000 12700000 1001.001 162000000 
Output2 538 922336 6877166 1001 73500000 
Output3 538 1097043 1030000 1001.001 18000000 
Output4 538 2196668 2220000 1001.001 41100000 
Input1 538 1426253 1180000 1001.001 20400000 
Input2 538 186.7565 407.9433 12 4001 
Input3 538 7630.32 44462.25 1001.001 650748.8 
Input4 538 6632150 4450000 1002 65000000 
NEXECS 538 4.40 2.00 0 10 
AUDIT 538 0.17 0.38 0 1 
CEO 538 0.86 0.35 0 1 
BSIZE 538 7.45 2.43 1 16 
OWN 537 68.37 27.59 8.01 100 
SHARB 517 2.29 1.34 0 6 
LOC 538 0.13 0.34 0 1 
AGE 538 13.37 12.74 0 42 
ORG 537 0.99 0.12 0 1 
INSTOWN 537 68.01 34.35 0 100 
INF 519 6.94 5.80 -4.86 37.39 
LSIZE 534 5.52 0.96 0 6.52 
GDP 535 25.20 1.14 22.14 26.94 
INSQ 533 16.07 2.57 11.53 21.67 
WGI 538 -1.16 2.51 -5.36 3.03 
Panel C: ASEAN Sample 
Variables Observations Mean  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Output1 151 878774.9      3855232    1001.001 2850000 
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Output2 151 656233.6      3682341 1001.001 2850000 
Output3 151 642631.2      3683065 1001.001 2850000 
Output4 151 767744.4      3705915 1001.001 2850000 
Input1 151 540838.3      2818687 1001.001 2120000 
Input2 151 554.4702     713.1266 16 2783 
Input3 151 3894.721     15479.26 1001 118842.2 
Input4 151 2893229 1550000 1001.152 11800000 
NEXECS 151 4.05 2.27 1 9 
AUDIT 151 0.42 0.50 0 1 
CEO 151 0.95 0.21 0 1 
BSIZE 151 7.34 3.75 3 23 
OWN 151 83.46 23.83 12 100 
SHARB 151 4.38 2.77 2 17 
LOC 151 0.59 0.49 0 1 
AGE 151 11.41 12.12 1 26 
ORG 151 0.82 0.38 0 1 
INSTOWN 151 87.37 25.20 0 100 
INF 151 6.57 4.95 -2.31 22.56 
LSIZE 151 5.50 1.05 0.69 6.51 
GDP 151 25.59 1.03 22.94 26.78 
INSQ 151 18.75 2.90 11.95 23.75 
WGI 151 -0.68 2.38 -4.25 3.41 
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics of all variables used in the regression models of the study for 
the full sample (Panel A); the MENA countries (Panel B); and ASEAN countries (Panel C). See Table (1) 
for variable definitions.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 TE SE NEX
ECS 
AUD
IT 
CEO BSIZ
E 
OW
N 
SSB LOC AGE ORG INST
OWN 
LSIZ
E 
INF GDP INSQ WGI 
TE 1.00                 
SE -0.13 1.00                
NEXECS -0.31 -0.01 1.00               
AUDIT -0.06 -0.06 0.22 1.00              
CEO 0.11 -0.03   0.30 0.09 1.00             
BSIZE -0.14 -0.15 0.39 0.07 0.03 1.00            
OWN 0.12 0.05 -0.23 0.09 -0.16 -0.33 1.00           
SSB -0.03  0.03 0.02 0.10 0.15 0.37 -0.08 1.00          
LOC 0.15 -0.10 -0.04 0.38 0.19 -0.13 0.31 0.21 1.00         
AGE 0.20 -0.02 -0.21 -0.24 -0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.14 -0.10 1.00        
ORG -0.13 0.23 0.13 -0.07 -0.05 -0.25 0.08 -0.35 -0.02 0.13 1.00       
INSTOW
N 
0.05 0.13 -0.08 0.20 -0.11 -0.31 0.68 -0.04 0.29 -0.10 0.12 1.00      
LSIZE 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 1.00     
INF 0.23 -0.21 -0.17 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.11 -0.28 0.25 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 1.00    
GDP 0.11 -0.29 -0.06 0.06 -0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.23 0.21 -0.13 -0.13 0.02 -0.01 -0.08 1.00   
INSQ 0.24 -0.02 -0.14 0.21 0.01 -0.15 0.19 0.21 0.67 -0.14 0.02 0.24 0.03 -0.28 0.05 1.00  
WGI -0.10 0.14 0.14 0.28 -0.09 -0.08 0.11 0.02 0.36 -0.41 0.15 0.15 0.03 -0.63 0.16 0.54 1.00 
Note: The table shows the Pearson pair-wise correlation matrix among main variables employed in our analysis for the full sample between years 2002-
2013. See Table1 for variable definitions. 
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Table 4: Summary of Operators’ Mean Efficiency Scores 
Panel A: Overall Sample 
Year Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
 Non-Bias Corrected Non-Bias Corrected 
2002 0.98 0.92 
2003 0.64 0.40 
2004 0.64 0.38 
2005 0.46 0.40 
2006 0.61 0.50 
2007 0.65 0.65 
2008 0.41 0.18 
2009 0.33 0.17 
2010 0.30 0.15 
2011 0.36 0.19 
2012 0.81 0.71 
2013 0.98 0.94 
2002-2013 0.51 0.44 
Panel B: MENA Sample 
Year Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
 Non-Bias Corrected Non-Bias Corrected 
2002   
2003 0.96 0.42 
2004 0.96 0.38 
2005 0.89 0.26 
2006 0.96 0.42 
2007 0.91 0.36 
2008 0.93 0.17 
2009 0.93 0.15 
2010 0.93 0.12 
2011 0.93 0.13 
2012 0.90 0.11 
2013 - - 
2002-2013 0.89 0.11 
Panel C: ASEAN Sample 
Year Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
 Non-Bias Corrected Non-Bias Corrected 
2002   
2003 0.30  
2004 0.99 0.91 
2005 0.99 0.84 
2006 0.99 0.74 
2007 0.99 0.81 
2008 0.99 0.92 
2009 0.99 0.79 
2010 0.99 0.56 
2011 0.98 0.55 
2012 0.96 0.69 
2013 - - 
2002-2013 0.98 0.47 
Note: The table presents the yearly efficiency scores for full sample  
(Panel A); the MENA countries (Panel B); and the ASEAN countries (Panel C). 
Limited year-observations for 2013 across the two subsamples contributes to 
error in estimations for R software. Hence, these were omitted. 
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Table 5: Efficiency Scores Based on the FDH and Order-M Estimators 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
ORDER-M 0.583 0.361 0.00 1.00 
FDH 0.509 0.455 0 1.00 
Note: FDH= Free Disposal Hull; Analysis computed using the R software 
 
 
Table 6: Homogeneous Smoothed Bootstrap Efficiency Scores 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Technical Efficiency 0.47 0.38 0.001 1.00 
Scale Efficiency 0.39 0.32 0.013 1.00 
Note: Analysis computed using the R software 
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Table 7a: Truncated Regression Results with Institutional Ownership 
Variables Technical Efficiency (TE) Scale Efficiency (SE) 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS -0.02*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.00 
AUDIT -0.04 0.19 -0.04 0.20 
CEO 0.15* 0.08 0.09** 0.03 
BSIZE 0.02** 0.04 0.01 0.17 
OWN 0.00 0.94 -0.00 0.46 
SHARB -0.00 0.78 0.03*** 0.00 
LOC 0.16*** 0.00 -0.20*** 0.00 
AGE 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.16 
ORG -0.18*** 0.00 0.36*** 0.00 
INSTOWN -0.00 0.36 0.00*** 0.00 
INF 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
LSIZE 0.01** 0.04 0.03** 0.04 
GDP 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 
WGI 0.01* 0.08 0.01 0.50 
CEO*BSIZE -0.03*** 0.01   
NEXECS*BSIZE   -0.01*** 0.00 
Notes: Regression carried out using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
  
 
Table 7b: Truncated Regression Results excluding Institutional Ownership 
Variables Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS -0.02*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.00 
AUDIT -0.04 0.15 -0.03 0.47 
CEO 0.15* 0.09 0.08* 0.08 
BSIZE 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.21 
OWN 0.00 0.55 0.00** 0.03 
SHARB -0.00 0.77 0.03*** 0.00 
LOC 0.16*** 0.00 -0.23*** 0.00 
AGE 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.50 
ORG -0.19*** 0.00 0.38*** 0.00 
INF 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
LSIZE 0.01 0.43 0.02* 0.10 
GDP 0.02* 0.10 0.02*** 0.00 
WGI 0.01* 0.09 0.01* 0.08 
CBS -0.03*** 0.01   
NBS   -0.01*** 0.00 
Notes: Regression carried out using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 8a: Regression including Institutional Ownership, controlling for 
 International Country Risk Guide 
Variables Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS -0.01** 0.05 0.08*** 0.00 
AUDIT -0.02 0.49 -0.04 0.25 
CEO 0.23*** 0.01 0.09** 0.04 
BSIZE 0.02** 0.03 0.01 0.16 
OWN 0.01 0.31 -0.00 0.50 
SHARB -0.00 0.50 0.03*** 0.00 
LOC 0.01 0.907 -0.23*** 0.00 
AGE 0.01*** 0.00 0.00 0.21 
ORG -0.20*** 0.00 0.36*** 0.00 
INSTOWN -0.00* 0.09 0.00*** 0.00 
INF 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
LSIZE 0.01 0.46 0.03** 0.05 
GDP 0.03** 0.02 0.02*** 0.00 
INSQ 0.04*** 0.00 0.01 0.18 
CBS -0.04*** 0.00   
NBS   -0.01*** 0.00 
Notes: Regression undertaken using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 
Table 8b:  Regression Excluding Institutional Ownership, controlling for 
 International Country Risk Guide 
Variables: Technical Efficiency Scale Efficiency 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS -0.02** 0.03 0.09*** 0.00 
AUDIT -0.03 0.36 -0.03 0.47 
CEO 0.22*** 0.01 0.08* 0.08 
BSIZE 0.02** 0.03 0.01 0.21 
OWN -0.00 0.94 0.00** 0.03 
SHARB -0.01 0.43 0.03*** 0.00 
LOC 0.01 0.86 -0.23*** 0.00 
AGE 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.49 
ORG -0.20*** 0.00 0.38*** 0.00 
INF 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
LSIZE 0.01 0.37 0.02* 0.10 
GDP 0.03** 0.02 0.02*** 0.00 
INSQ 0.03*** 0.00 0.01* 0.08 
CBS -0.04*** 0.00   
NBS   -0.01*** 0.00 
Notes: Regression undertaken using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Final Sample distributions for the Whole Sample Period 
 
Countries Observations Number of Firms Percentage 
Algeria 7 1 0.75 
Bahrain 27 4 2.99 
Bangladesh 9 1 0.75 
Brunei 16 3 2.25 
Egypt 29 7 5.25 
Indonesia 57 13 9.75 
Iran 43 9 6.75 
Jordan 18 3 2.25 
Kuwait 58 11 8.25 
Malaysia 49 10 7.5 
Palestine 5 1 0.75 
Pakistan 29 5 3.75 
Qatar 34 7 5.25 
Saudi Arabia 120 27 20.25 
Senegal 3 1 0.75 
Sri Lanka 10 1 0.75 
Sudan 106 15 11.25 
Syria  7 2 1.5 
Tunisia 11 2 1.5 
U.A.E 38 9 6.75 
Yemen 13 2 1.5 
Total 689 134 100 
Notes: The sample comprises of 134 Takaful firms (689 observations) operating across 21 countries between 
2002 and 2013. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
MENA Regression Analyses with ICRG Variable 
Variables TE SE 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS -0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 0.78 
AUDIT 0.02 0.66 -0.07 0.14 
CEO -0.08** 0.02 0.10** 0.02 
BSIZE -0.00 0.48 -0.03*** 0.00 
OWN -0.00 0.67 0.00 0.83 
SHARB -0.01 0.46 0.09*** 0.00 
LOC 0.14*** 0.00 -0.07 0.27 
AGE 0.00*** 0.00 0.00** 0.02 
ORG -0.56*** 0.00 0.26** 0.30 
INSTOWN -0.00* 0.07 0.00*** 0.00 
INF 0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
LSIZE 0.02* 0.07 0.02 0.22 
GDP 0.01** 0.05 0.02** 0.02 
INSQ 0.04*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.01 
CBS -0.08*** 0.01   
NBS   -0.07** 0.05 
Notes: Regression performed using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
APPENDIX B 
 
MENA Regression Analyses with WGI 
 
Variables Technical Efficiency (TE) Scale Efficiency (SE) 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS -0.03*** 0.00 0.01 0.43 
AUDIT 0.05 0.23 -0.10** 0.04 
CEO -0.09** 0.03 0.12*** 0.01 
BSIZE -0.00 0.61 0.03*** 0.00 
OWN -0.00 0.12 0.00 0.99 
SHARB -0.00 0.64 0.09*** 0.00 
LOC 0.06 0.24 -0.01 0.85 
AGE 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.01 
ORG -0.43*** 0.00 0.31*** 0.01 
INSTOWN -0.00 0.74 0.00*** 0.00 
INF 0.02*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
LSIZE 0.03*** 0.01 0.02 0.13 
GDP 0.03*** 0.00 0.01 0.20 
WGI 0.01* 0.10 0.02* 0.10 
CBS -0.08** 0.06   
NBS   -0.13* 0.09 
Notes: Regression carried out using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
South East Asia Regression Analyses with WGI 
 
Variables Technical Efficiency (TE) Scale Efficiency (SE) 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS 0.01 0.60 -0.02* 0.09 
AUDIT -0.11 0.13 0.10** 0.04 
CEO 0.33*** 0.01 0.12 0.11 
BSIZE -0.01 0.37 -0.01 0.43 
OWN 0.00 0.97 -0.00 0.72 
SHARB -0.02 0.24 0.02* 0.08 
LOC 0.13* 0.07 -0.16*** 0.00 
AGE 0.01* 0.09 0.00 0.84 
ORG 0.01 0.91 -0.03 0.53 
INSTOWN -0.00 0.59 0.00 0.14 
INF -0.01 0.28 -0.01 0.19 
LSIZE 0.01 0.70 -0.01 0.73 
GDP 0.01 0.40 0.00 0.61 
WGI -0.03* 0.09 0.07*** 0.00 
CBS -0.16*** 0.01   
NBS   -0.05*** 0.01 
Notes: Regression performed using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
South East Asia Regression Analyses with ICRG Variable 
 
Variables Technical Efficiency (TE) Scale Efficiency (SE) 
 Coefficient P-Value Coefficient P-Value 
NEXECS 0.00 0.81 -0.01 0.23 
AUDIT -0.09 0.18 0.15*** 0.00 
CEO 0.28** 0.02 0.12 0.15 
BSIZE -0.01 0.41 -0.11 0.12 
OWN 0.00 0.82 -0.00 0.71 
SHARB -0.01 0.74 0.03*** 0.00 
LOC 0.24*** 0.00 -0.18*** 0.00 
AGE 0.01** 0.02 0.00 0.36 
ORG 0.04 0.61 -0.02 0.78 
INSTOWN -0.00 0.50 0.00** 0.04 
INF -0.01 0.16 -0.02*** 0.00 
LSIZE 0.02 0.37 0.00 0.86 
GDP 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.25 
INSQ -0.05*** 0.00 0.00 0.77 
CBS -0.18** 0.03   
NBS   -0.08*** 0.04 
Notes: Regression performed using Truncated Regression. ***, ** and * demonstrate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
